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Over the past half-century, there is no question that societal concern for animal welfare has
increased steadily and exponentially. But the form it has taken is something of a crazy-quilt not
based on any sort of rational strategy. Some of it has been in the form of consumer rejection of
products derived from the suffering of innocent animals. For example, as early as the 1970s a
survey of the readers of Glamour Magazine, certainly a group pre-disposed towards enhancing
their personal appearance, revealed that the vast majority thought experimentation on animals
was too great a price to pay for new cosmetics. Largely as a result of efforts by the cosmetics
industry responding to societal pressure, the testing of cosmetics on live animals through such
invasive and scientifically questionable tests as the LD50 and the Draize test has been significantly
curtailed through the development of molecular biological alternatives functioning at the cellular
level.
In a similar manner, animal agricultural practices perceived by consumers of animal
products to be morally unacceptable, such as severe confinement of egg-laying hens in battery
cages, were eliminated by such chains as McDonald’s, beginning in 2001. In 2008, I convinced
Smithfield farms to eliminate extreme confinement of pregnant sows in gestation crates when
their own polls of consumers indicated that 78% disapproved of such high confinement.
In some cases, the welfare of animals used for human purposes has been legislatively
encoded, more often in state than in federal law. In 1967, the federal Animal Welfare Act was
passed, but was notorious for its inadequacy. The purpose of the Act was primarily to assure petowners that their animals would not be kidnapped and sold to animal research laboratories.
Although it covered housing and transport of some research animals, the 1967 Act expressed no
concern about the actual design or conduct of research. For the purposes of the Act, well over
90% of the animals used in research – rats, mice, and birds – were not animals.
Also not covered by any federal legislation is the use of animals in industrial agriculture,
arguably the cause of more suffering than all the other animal uses combined. Although farm

1

Animal Sentience 2017.034: Rollin on Birch on Precautionary Principle

animals used in biomedical research are covered in the Animal Welfare Act, no agricultural
activities are. Shamefully, as of this writing, there is not a single analgesic approved for use in food
animals, despite the fact that they are subject to numerous surgical procedures and such painful
modalities as hot iron branding. Equally shameful is the fact that the Humane Slaughter Act does
not cover birds, leading to horrendous slaughter practices for poultry.
And although my colleagues and I were able to convince Congress in 1985 of the need to
pass an amendment to the Animal Welfare Act requiring control of pain and distress in research
animals, to this day rats and mice are excluded from its protection. On the other hand, all animals
used in federally funded animal research are protected by National Institutes of Health guidelines
and rules. This represents an incoherent political solution to a moral problem.
Although a paper chronicling all the absurdities and inadequacies of legislative control of
animal suffering would have to be significantly longer than my brief discussion, enough has been
said to show the reader the need for a rational basis for public policy regarding animal welfare.
The target article by Birch (2017) is a well-reasoned and well-written exposition of the possibility
of using the Precautionary Principle as a rational basis for according sentience to animals in order
to protect them. In essence, Birch is arguing that in situations where failure to enact policy on
matters encompassing animal cognition – most particularly animal pain (and presumably animal
distress) – could lead to harm to animal welfare, one should give the animals “the benefit of the
doubt.”
This point is incisively and subtly explored by Birch. It is evident that if such a regulatory
principle were put in place in an all-encompassing legislative form, the absurdities noted above
would be mitigated at least and probably eliminated altogether. Since the Precautionary Principle
is well-established and accepted, particularly in Europe regarding such issues as climate change,
it seems to be a reasonable strategy for animal welfare.
The only divergence I have with Birch concerns his stated desire to remain in accord with
scientific evidence. I am not taking an anti-science, Luddite position. Rather, I base my claim on
the fact that systematic ignoring and/or denial of the reality of animal pain and other forms of
animal cognition during the 20th century by both the veterinary and scientific research
communities, particularly those forms related to suffering, was based not on scientific evidence
but on positivistic ideology and expediency.
The biological and psychological sciences were solidly rooted in Darwinian evolutionary
theory. Darwin himself had declared that psychological traits were as continuous phylogenetically
as were morphological and physiological ones (Darwin 1871, 1872). He had even done elegant
experiments on the rational problem-solving abilities of earthworms (Darwin, 1886). Yet
twentieth-century psychological science, both Anglo-American behaviorism and European
ethology, rejected the study of animal consciousness (Schiller 1957). Lloyd Morgan – best known
for articulating “Morgan’s Canon,” often cited as the basis for eliminating consciousness from
psychology – only used his Canon to eliminate the unnecessary attribution of “higher
consciousness”; he was otherwise a panpsychist who believed that consciousness was present
throughout the phylogenetic scale and indeed in all of nature, including inanimate nature! J.B.
Watson, the founder of behaviorism, eschewed consciousness to create a “technology of
behavior.”
Animal consciousness was denied out of self-serving moral assumptions in order to avoid
the inescapable moral and societal consequences of performing invasive research on beings who
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could suffer. And practice inexorably followed theory. When I was presenting to Congress what
became the 1985 Amendments to the Animal Welfare Act (making control of pain and distress in
research animals federally mandatory), I did a literature search on laboratory animal analgesia at
the Library of Congress, and found only two papers, one of which declared ironically that there
ought to be papers on the subject. Since the passage of that law, one can now find more than
13,000 papers.
In sum, Birch has presented a persuasive approach that one can hope will serve to create
a rational and coherent basis for policy responsive to the societal concern about animal welfare.
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ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS
On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU
Animal Studies will host a conference on Animal Consciousness.
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish
feel pain? Are non-human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does research on animal consciousness
affect the ethical treatment of animals? What is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness and
vice versa? What are the best methods for assessing consciousness in non-human animals?

Speakers and panelists include:
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland,
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts,
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney,
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter,
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy)

Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao.
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday
November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 8th St).
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”,
“Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness and ethics”.
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel
discussion.
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date.
Registration is free but required.

Register here.
See also the conference website.

